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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
PIONEER STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, 
RAY M. MAAG, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, THE TITLE 
GUARANTEE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents 
Case No. 20346 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT TITLE GUARANTEE 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did payment by the insurer (Title Guarantee) 
to the insured (Pioneer), pursuant to Pioneerrs threat to 
sell the remaining collateral consisting of two condominiums, 
of the entire amount of principal indebtedness, interest 
and fees, which amount was in excess of the face amount of 
insurance under a lender's title insurance policy, discharge 
Title Guaranteed responsibility to Pioneer under the policy? 
2- Was Pioneer, who had previously purchased Lake 
Meadows, the other parcel of the insured collateral in fee 
-2-
as an investment at a foreclosure sale by a prior lender> 
entitled to require Title Guarantee to pay Pioneer 
additional amounts under the policy for Pioneer's alleged 
losses on that investment because of lack of an access to 
Lake Meadows which access had been a part of the collateral 
but had been earlier released by Pioneer? 
3. Did the lower court correctly determine that 
Pioneer failed to prove fraud and bad faith, and had not 
mitigated its alleged damages? 
PREFATORY STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case involves a situation in which Pioneer Bank 
in October3 1979 loaned $703000 secured by two condominiums 
and the Lake Meadows platted subdivision to defendants Dennis 
Church, Jay Lewis and Ray Maag and to Douglas W. Church (R. 
466), the brother of Dennis, who was not named a defendant 
and had previously filed for bankruptcy. The individual 
defendants and Douglas W. Church owned and controlled defendant 
Rocky Mountain which issued to Pioneer on the above loan 
a lender's title insurance policy showing Pioneer in a first 
position on the condominiums and in a second position on 
Lake Meadows. The policy was issued through Rocky Mountain's 
- 3 -
underwriter, Title Guarantee, in the face amount of $70,000. 
(R. 467-68). The loan was renewed several times and was 
in default in the fall of 1981. (R. 480, 545). Thereafter, 
in December, 1981 Pioneer purchased as an investment the 
fee title to the Lake Meadows property at a foreclosure sale 
by Utah Valley Bank who was in the first priority position. 
(R. 564, 518). In February, 1982 Pioneer threatened to sell 
the two condominiums, the remaining collateral, to collect 
the debt unless Title Guarantee paid the total indebtedness 
of $77*326.98, which Title Guarantee did on February 18, 
1982. (Finding No. 12, R. 424). In May, 1982 Pioneer asserted 
a claim against Title Guarantee to the effect that Pioneer 
was entitled to additional amounts under the policy because 
of a lack of access to Lake Meadows which access Pioneer 
had released in April, 1980 from its collateral. Title 
Guarantee denied the claim. (R. 691, Ex. 10). Pioneer then 
brought this action alleging fraud and bad faith in regard 
to the original loan and in regard to the denial of its claim. 
(Second Amended Complaint, R. 210). The lower court found 
all issues in favor of the defendants. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are generally in chronological 
order and are divided into numbered paragraphs to make 
citation more convenient: 
1. Ray Maag originated the Lake Meadows subdivision, 
and the property on which it was located was purchased through 
Ray Maag and his wife. (R. 698). 
2. Thereafter, Maag assigned an interest in the 
property and subdivision to Jay Lewis, Douglas Church and 
Dennis Church who became his partners. (R. 698). 
3. To provide one of the road accesses to the Lake 
Meadows subdivision Maag made an oral agreement with John 
Taylor to obtain a 50 by 50 foot piece of Taylor's property 
on which there was a conflict of title in exchange for an 
equal amount of property owned by the partners. (R. 699-701, 
6l4). The partners had already acquired an interest in the 
Taylor property by reason of a tax deed some years before. 
(R. 613). 
4. Maag told his partners about the agreement with 
Taylor. (R. 701). 
5. To obtain formal approval of the subdivision 
plat from Provo City it was necessary to complete the documents 
acquiring the Taylor access property for the Lake Meadows 
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subdivision, and because Maag was out of town and Taylor 
had not then executed a deed, Douglas Church signed TaylorTs 
name to a deed for TaylorTs property. (R. 571-72). 
6. Douglas Church knew that signing Taylor's name 
was wrong (R. 626) but did so as an act of expedience because 
of the pressure of time and because he relied on the prior 
oral agreement with Taylor. (R. 613-18). 
7. Shortly after Provo City approved the Lake Meadows 
plat in October, 1979, Pioneer loaned Douglas Church, Dennis 
Church, Jay Lewis and Ray Maag $70,000 secured by a first 
trust deed on two Willowbrook condominium units and a second 
trust deed on Lake Meadows. (R. 466-67). Although the 
borrowers proposed that Lake Meadows be the security for 
the loan, Pioneer insisted on the two condominiums as additional 
security. (R. 515). 
8. Kent Nelson, the officer of Pioneer who handled 
the loan said Douglas Church told him that the loan was 
for developing Lake Meadows. (R. 466). However, Pioneer 
did not treat the loan as a development loan. (R. 531). 
9. Douglas Church did not disclose to Pioneer that 
he had signed Taylor's name to the deed to obtain approval 
of the Lake Meadows plat. (R. 572). 
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10. Pioneer received a copy of the recorded plat 
of Lake Meadows before making the loan (Re 472), and was 
aware of the location of the road accesses when the loan 
was made. (R. 527). 
11. At that time3 the four borrowers were the prin-
cipals of Rocky Mountain Title. (R. 467). The policy issued 
by Rocky Mountain to Pioneer accurately stated Pioneer's 
priority position in regard to Lake Meadows and the condom-
iniums. (Ex. 3)« Nelson said he was aware of the difference 
between an owner's and a lender's policy (R. 533) and was 
experienced in making loans, taking collateral, preparing 
documents, and investigating property. (R. 510A). 
12. Shortly thereafter when Taylor discovered that 
Douglas Church had signed his name to the deed, he was angry 
(R. 706), and demanded substantially more consideration than 
under his original agreement. (R. 708-09, 619, 662). 
Negotiations with Taylor continued for many months there-
after. (R. 710). 
13. Because no settlement was reached, Taylor commenced 
a quiet title action in March, 1980 against Douglas Church, 
Dennis Church, Jay Lewis, Ray Maag, Rocky Mountain Title, 
and Western Home Bank (whose name was thereafter changed 
-7-
to Pioneer), et al., and recorded a lis pendens on March 
11, 1980. (R. 717-18, Ex. 32). 
14. Although Kent Nelson testified that Pioneer 
was not aware of Taylor's lawsuit and that he did not find 
a copy of the summons in the file, he admitted that he was 
not the registered agent for Pioneer, was not the custodian 
of the file, and didn't know who, if anyone, from Pioneer 
was served. (R. 529~30). There was no other evidence presented 
by Pioneer showing lack of knowledge about or service of 
the Taylor lawsuit or knowledge of the official record or 
lis pendens. 
15. In April, 1980 after commencement of the Taylor 
action Douglas Church asked Pioneer to reconvey the disputed 
property which Pioneer did on April 8, 1980. (Ex. 5). 
16. Nelson testified that Douglas Church told him 
the property to be reconveyed did not affect Pioneer's 
interest. (R. 474). Douglas Church testified that he showed 
Nelson where the property to be reconveyed was located on 
the plat, told Nelson there was a quiet title action and 
since the loan covered the property, a reconveyance was 
needed. (R. 612). 
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17. In August, 1981 Pioneer had filed a notice of 
default against Douglas Church, Dennis Church, Jay Lewis 
and Ray Maag on the $70,000 loan. (R. 545-46, Ex. 21). 
18. In December, 1981 at the foreclosure sale of 
Utah Valley Bank's first trust deed on Lake Meadows, Pioneer 
purchased the fee title for $81,631.39. (R. 486). Pioneer 
did not notify Title Guarantee of the sale or purchase. 
(R. 528). 
19. When Pioneer bought Lake Meadows at the fore-
closure sale of Utah Valley Bank, Pioneer thought that the 
two condominium units were sufficient to pay off the debt. 
(R. 517-18, 565). 
20. Although Kent Nelson testified that one of the 
reasons Pioneer bought Lake Meadows was to protect its 
collateral, both Nelson and Walter Davidson, president of 
Pioneer, also testified that Pioneer bought with the 
expectation of making a profit. (R. 518-19, 564). Nelson 
also testified that he knew Pioneer's trust deed on Lake 
Meadows was extinguished when Pioneer bought at the Utah 
Valley Bank sale. (R. 523). 
21. David Hodgson, on behalf of Title Guarantee, 
began investigating an alleged problem in regard to Lake 
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Meadows and the condominiums after receipt of a letter dated 
January 15, 1982 from Steven Grow of Pinecrest Associates 
on another policy issued by Rocky Mountain which also insured 
the two condominiums. (R. 711-12, Ex. 13). 
22. When Hodgson contacted Pioneer in late January 
or early February, 1982, he was told by Davidson that Pioneer 
was going to sell the condominiums if Title Guarantee did 
not pay off the loan. (R. 565, 723-24). The condominiums 
were scheduled for sale by Pioneer on March 1, 1982. (R. 
548). Title Guarantee (Safeco) paid Pioneer $77,326.98, 
the amount calculated by Pioneer for the remaining $60,000 
principal loan balance plus accrued interest and fees. 
(Finding No. 12, R. 424; also see R. 717, 720-21, 521). 
23. At the time the loan was paid by Title Guarantee, 
Davidson proposed to Hodgson that Pioneer would sell its 
ownership position in Lake Meadows that it had purchased 
for $81,000 to Title Guarantee for $100,000. (R. 562, 723). 
24. Davidson also told Hodgson that Utah County 
was a "hot bed of corruption" (R. 562), and said Hodgson 
told him that there were some problems and because Pioneer 
was in a first position on the condominiums Title Guarantee 
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would pay the outstanding debt to Pioneer. (R. 556). 
Davidson discussed the double mortgaging of properties in 
Utah County with Hodgson. (R. 563). Hodgson said the reason 
he did not discuss his preliminary discoveries about Lake 
Meadows in greater detail with Davidson was because Davidson 
told him that Davidson had investigated the situation, was 
going to do further investigation and knew about it. (R. 
680). 
25. In May, 1982 Pioneer made a claim against Title 
Guarantee because of the loss of the Taylor access property 
(R. 691), and then filed suit claiming that Title Guarantee 
was liable for the loss of the Taylor access property. (R. 
2). Pioneer twice amended its complaint to allege finally 
that Title Guarantee was liable for fraud in denying Pioneerfs 
claim for additional amounts. (R. 210). 
26. Jud Harward, an appraiser for Pioneer, testified 
at trial that he appraised the Lake Meadows property in 1982 
and determined that it had a value of $144,000, and that 
his current appraisal at trial showed the same value. (R. 
762-63). He also said he had no opinion as to what Lake 
Meadows was worth without the one access. (R. 764). He 
said he checked the records two days before he testified 
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and that any diminution in value was based on his assumption 
that there was no access to the property. (R. 763)• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The principal elements of a title insurance loan 
policy are generally (1) that the collateral as provided 
in the policy is available as a source of payment on the 
debt, if necessary, and (2) that the amount of insurance 
is limited to the amount of the debt plus interest and expenses 
of foreclosure or the face amount of the policy, whichever 
is less. Payment by Title Guarantee to Pioneer upon demand 
by Pioneer of the entire amount of the principal indebtedness, 
accrued interest and fees on February 17, 1982 discharged 
all liability of Title Guarantee to Pioneer under the policy. 
2. Because Pioneer purchased Lake Meadows in December, 
1981 as an investment when Pioneer knew that it had previously 
released the Taylor access from its insured collateral, 
Pioneer cannot thereafter claim that Title Guarantee is res-
ponsible for that lack of access. 
3. The lower court properly determined that Pioneer 
did not prove fraud or bad faith. There was conflicting 
testimony of facts, and Pioneer's own witnesses contradict 
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Pioneer's arguments. Payment in full of the indebtedness 
and fees eliminated any claim of fraud or bad faith. In 
regard to mitigation of damages, PioneerTs own appraisal 
witness on the value of Lake Meadows admittedly based his 
appraisal on the wrong assumption that there was no access 
whatever and then valued Lake Meadows as a subdivision the 
same in 1984 as in 1982. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PAYMENT TO PIONEER OP THE ENTIRE DEBT 
AND PEES TERMINATED TITLE GUARANTEE'S 
PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDER ITS LENDERfS 
POLICY. 
The provisions of the lender's policy determine the 
contractual liability of Title Guarantee, which liability 
cannot be increased unless some independent fraud or bad 
faith is proven. The policy describes the status of the 
collateral listed as security for the loan and states that 
the maximum amount of liability shall not exceed the least 
of (a) the total indebtedness, or (b) the face amount of 
the policy which in this case was $70,000. 
Pioneer argues that because Pioneer made no specific 
claim against the policy as of February 17, 1982 when Pioneer 
demanded and received $77,326.98, which payment was the full 
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amount of the principal indebtedness, interest and fees 
as calculated by Pioneer, Pioneer still has coverage of the 
$70,000 face amount of the policy. Pioneer contends that 
Title Guarantee made the February, 1982 payment as a result 
of other policies and thus there was no claim or payment 
made under Pioneer?s policy. Pioneer specifically relies 
on paragraph 2(a) of the Conditions and Stipulations in the 
policy which provision applies to the continuation of insurance 
in a case where the insured lender acquires fee title- Under 
paragraph 2(a) there are two major elements, i.e., (1) the 
continuation of insurance, and (2) the insurer's limits of 
liability. Pioneer does not acknowledge that full payment 
to Pioneer affects the limits of liability but instead 
emphasizes the continuation of insurance after ownership 
was acquired. 
Such an argument is based on a misunderstanding 
of the limitations of the policy. The applicable provisions 
of paragraph 2(a) clearly limit the amount of coverage not-
withstanding the continuation of coverage. Paragraph 2(a) 
states as follows: 
2. (a) Continuation of Insurance after 
Acquisition of Title. 
This policy shall continue in force as of 
Date of Policy in favor of an insured who 
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acquires all or any part of the estate or interest 
in the land described in Schedule A by foreclosure, 
trusteefs sale, conveyance in lieu of foreclosure, 
or other legal manner which discharges the lien of 
the insured mortgage, . . . provided that the amount 
of insurance hereunder after such acquisition, ex-
clusive of costs, attorneys1 fees and expenses which 
the Company may become obligated to pay,, shall not 
exceed the least of: 
(i) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule 
A; [or] 
(ii) the amount of the unpaid principal of the 
indebtedness as defined in paragraph 8 hereof, plus 
interest thereon, expenses of foreclosure and amounts 
advanced to protect the lien of the insured mortgage 
and secured by said insured mortgage at the time 
of acquisition of such estate or interest in the 
land; . . . 
Pioneer also cites paragraph 2(b) as support for 
its position, but by its terms said paragraph only applies 
to situations where the insured not only had acquired title 
but had then conveyed the property to a third person. Since 
Pioneer retained the Lake Meadows property, paragraph 2(b) 
is not applicable.' 
In any case, neither paragraph 2(a) nor 2(b) increases 
the liability of Title Guarantee beyond the payment of the 
indebtedness. Pioneer admits that Title Guarantee paid the 
total amount of the indebtedness on February 17, 19^2 as 
calculated and demanded by Pioneer. Even if Pioneer's demand 
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or threat of sale in February, 1982 is not considered to 
be a claim against the policy, and Pioneer's only claim was 
made in May, 1982, Pioneer still would not have received 
more in May, 1982 than it did in February, 1982. The timing 
of the payment had no effect on the limits of coverage. 
The other applicable provisions of the policy also 
limit the coverage to the amount of indebtedness, if any. 
Paragraph 6(a) of the policy states as follows: 
6. Determination and Payment of Loss. 
(a) The liability of the Company under this 
policy shall in no case exceed the least of: 
(i) the actual loss of the insured claimant; 
or 
(ii) the amount of insurance stated in 
Schedule A, or, if applicable, the amount of 
insurance as defined in paragraph 2(a) hereof; 
or 
(iii) the amount of the indebtedness secured 
by the insured mortgage as determined under 
paragraph 8 hereof, at the time the loss or 
damage insured against hereunder occurs, 
together with interest thereon. . . . 
In addition, paragraph 8(a) provides that " . . . 
Payment in full by any person . . . shall terminate all liability 
of the Company except as provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof 
. . ." As discussed above, paragraph 2(a) does not increase 
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the amount of coverage, beyond the stated limits. Paragraph 
11 states that claims of loss are limited to the provisions, 
conditions and stipulations of the policy. 
PioneerTs claim under the policy in May, 1982 is 
for an alleged defect in the title, i.e., the lack of the 
Taylor access. In such instances, the damage cannot exceed 
the face amount of the policy. Annot.: Title Insurance -
Amount of Recovery, 60 A.L.R. 2d 972, 976. 
A number of the cases cited by Pioneer are contained 
in the above annotation. None of the cited cases involve 
situations wherein the insurer paid off the entire debt to 
the insured prior to the time a formal claim was made on 
the policy. None of the cases involve a situation where 
the insured released a portion of the collateral and then 
acquired fee title to the collateral all of which Pioneer 
did without notifying Title Guarantee. Most of the cases 
cited by Pioneer in support of its various arguments either 
do not involve title insurance or merely state general prin-
ciples which are not applicable to this case: i.e., 
American Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Claybough, 3 02 S.W. 2d 
545 (Ark. 1957) (health and accident policy); Stone v. Waters, 
483 S.W. 2d 639 (Mo. 1972) (automobile policy); Dillingham 
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Corp. v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 
503 P.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1974) (liability policy); Armstrong 
v. Hanover Ins. Co., 289 A.2d 669 (Vt. 1972) (automobile 
policy); McLaughlin v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 
565 P. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal.1983) (medical policy); Gordon 
v. Bialystaker Center & Bikur Cholem, Inc., 385 N.E. 2d 285 
(N.Y. 1978) (fraudulent transfer); Glickman v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., 107 P.2d 252 (Cal. 1940) (life policy); Deios v. 
Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979) (auto-
mobile policy); St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta Construction 
Co., Inc., 316 N.E. 2d 51 (111. 1974) (construction dispute); 
Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 26l, 430 P.2d 
576 (1967) (automobile policy); Bowen v. Olson, 576 P.2d 862 
(Utah 1978) (specific performance of land contract); Blodgett 
v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) (question of confidential 
relationship); B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 
442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972) (implied authority of agent); 
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven Connecticut, 426 
P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (liability policy); Mammas v. Oro Valley 
Townhouses, Inc., 638 P.2d 1367 (AZ 1981) (claim of fraud); 
Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P.2d 852 (1953) 
(fiduciary relationship); Stevens v. Marco, 305 P.2d 669 
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(Cal. 1957) (fiduciary relationship); Pratt v. Board of Education 
of the Uintah County School District, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977) 
(employee relationship); Utah Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Orville Andrews & Sons, 665 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1983) (farm liability 
policy); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 
1973) (fire policy). 
In another case cited by Pioneer involving an owner's 
title insurance policy where the issue was the amount of 
damages when title to a portion of the insured property failed, 
Hartman v. Shambaugh, 630 P.2d 758 (N.M. 198l), the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico held that the insured was entitled to 
recover his "actual loss" up to the face amount of the policy. 
Also see Couch On Insurance 2d, §57 :l88. Although the policy 
in this case was a lender's policy, the same restriction on 
damages applies. Because there was no loss to Pioneer on 
the insured loan Pioneer had no loss under the policy even 
if the "insurance" under the policy continued because of 
Pioneer's purchase. 
There is yet another reason why Pioneer cannot prevail. 
If it were concluded that Pioneer received no payment under 
the policy and the $77,326.98 payment was merely gratuitous, 
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as Pioneer argues, then Pioneer would be unjustly enriched. 
If Pioneer is not willing to give Title Guarantee credit for 
the February, 1982 payment because Pioneer had, as it argues, 
not then made a formal claim, Pioneer is still not entitled 
to ignore the payment. The fact that another personTs claim 
was cleared up by the payment does not mean that Pioneer was 
not paid. Pioneer demanded and received the entire insured 
debt owed by the Church brothers, Lewis and Maag. At the 
very least under such circumstances the law implies a con-
tract and requires credit for the payment. 17 C.J.S. Contracts 
§6. Also see Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976) wherein 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment is acknowledged. Under 
no circumstance would Pioneer have been entitled to more 
in February, 1982 than it in fact received. 
II. PIONEER CAUSED ITS OWN ALLEGED DAMAGE BY 
VOLUNTARILY ACQUIRING FEE TITLE TO LAKE 
MEADOWS AS AN INVESTMENT IN DECEMBER, 
1981 WHICH ACQUISITION PIONEER MADE EVEN 
THOUGH PIONEER KNEW IT HAD EARLIER 
RELEASED THE TAYLOR ACCESS IN 1980. 
In addition to the fact that the provisions of the 
policy do not support Pioneer?s contentions, there is 
another reason why Pioneer is wrong. Even if it is 
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assumed that Pioneer made no claim against the policy in 
February, 1982, and also assumed that Title Guarantee wrongly 
failed at that time to disclose that Douglas Church had signed 
Taylorfs name, there is still no connection between those 
assumptions and PioneerTs claimed damage. It is clear that 
the source of "Pioneerfs damage, if any, was Pioneer's own 
intentional purchase of Lake Meadows as an investment at the 
Utah Valley Bank sale in December, 1981 which purchase was 
with the knowledge that Pioneer had previously reconveyed 
the Taylor access in April, 1980. Pioneer did not notify 
Title Guarantee at the times of the release of the Taylor 
access, the Taylor lawsuit and lis pendens, or Pioneer's 
purchase of Lake Meadows. 
III. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT RESOLVED DISPUTED 
EVIDENCE AGAINST PIONEER IN REGARD TO ITS 
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD, BAD FAITH AND THE 
VALUE OF LAKE MEADOWS, PIONEER WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO PREVAIL ON THOSE ISSUES. 
In Finding of Fact No. 19 (R. 426) the trial court 
determined that Pioneer had presented no persuasive evidence 
of malice, bad faith or fraud by Title Guarantee. The trial 
court also concluded that Title Guarantee was not liable for 
malice, bad faith, fraud or breach of contract, and that the 
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individual defendants did not intend to defraud Pioneer. 
Conclusions of Law Nos. 3-5 (R. 427). There is substantial 
evidence to support the trial court's Findings and Conclusions. 
The one person, Douglas Church, who Pioneer claims was 
involved in all of the alleged fraudulent actions and mis-
representations or omissions was not even a defendant in this 
case. Pioneer dismissed Ray Maag as a defendant prior to 
trial. (R. 257-58). 
Pioneer's argument that Hodgson on behalf of Title 
Guarantee knowingly concealed facts from Pioneer is unfair 
and contrary to the Findings of the trial court. At the time 
Hodgson first talked with Nelson and Davidson after January 
15y 1982 about the problem, Pioneer had been involved over 
an extended period of time in a number of transactions which 
were of record and any reasonable person would assume that 
Pioneer was fully aware of the situation. There is no question 
that Pioneer signed the reconveyance of the Taylor access 
nearly two years before Hodgson knew about it. Pioneer had 
filed its notice of default on the Lake Meadows obligation 
in the fall, 1981 and had purchased Utah Valley Bank's 
position in December, 1981. Davidson told Hodgson that 
Pioneer had done some investigation, that Utah Valley was 
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a hot bed of corruption, that Pioneer purchased Lake 
Meadows as an investment, that Pioneer would not sell 
Lake Meadows to Title Guarantee unless Pioneer were paid 
an additional $20,000 over the amount Pioneer had paid 
and that Pioneer intended to sell the two condominiums 
unless Title Guarantee paid the insured obligation in full 
prior to March 1, 1982. Pioneer also knew that the two 
Willowbrook Hills condominiums had been double mortgaged and 
that Title Guarantee was obligated to clear up the problem. 
Also Pioneer did not present persuasive evidence that it did 
not know about the Taylor lawsuit or the Lis Pendens. Doug 
Church testified that he told Nelson of the Taylor action. 
Under the above facts, the trial court properly con-
cluded that Pioneer was fully informed and that nothing was 
intentionally or unintentionally concealed from Pioneer by 
Title Guarantee. There is no evidence that Title Guarantee 
was informed of any problem in regard to Lake Meadows prior 
to January 15, 1982. Pioneer attempts to rely on a statement 
by Doug Church that he may have contacted Title Guarantee 
in 1980. Church corrected that statement by testifying that 
he did not talk to Title Guarantee until after he was con-
tacted by Hodgson. (See R. 604-05). It is uncontradicted 
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that Hodgson did not begin his investigation until after 
January 15, 1982. In addition, there was no evidence of 
any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Rocky 
Mountain who was only the agent of Title Guarantee for 
issuing policies. (See R. 608-09). If there were any 
misrepresentations to Pioneer they could only have been made 
by Doug Church or Jay Lewis in their individual capacities 
and not reasonably within the scope of their authority from 
Rocky Mountain and certainly not from Title Guarantee because 
neither Church nor Lewis was an agent of Title Guarantee. 
The trial court properly determined that Pioneer 
did not present persuasive evidence of any knowledge by Title 
Guarantee and certainly not of fraud which must be shown by 
clear and convincing evidence. Universal C.I.T. Credit 
Corporation v. Sohm, 15 Utah 2d 262, 391 P.2d 293 (1964); 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952). To impute 
fraud to a principal it must be shown that the acts complained 
of were within the scope of the agent's authority. See 
Couch on Insurance 2d, §26:437. Title Guarantee clearly 
demonstrated its good faith when it honored its contract and 
paid Pioneer the entire debt in February, 1982 when Pioneer 
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threatened to sell the two condominiums if it was not 
paid. 
Pioneer made no objection to any evidence of lack 
of notice at trial and even if there had been an objection 
it would not change the fact that Pioneer had taken action 
and participated in prior events and had purchased the Lake 
Meadows property (presumably after some investigation) 
without ever once contacting Title Guarantee. In fact, 
the first contact between Title Guarantee and Pioneer was 
made by Hodgson after January 15, 1982. Certainly nothing 
that Pioneer did or participated in prior to January 15, 1982 
such as reconveying the Taylor access property or purchasing 
Lake Meadows can be blamed on Title Guarantee. Under those 
circumstances, Pioneer's argument that Title Guarantee waived 
defenses is untenable. See Vol. l6C5 Appieman: Insurance 
Law & Practice Ch. 324, §9261 wherein it is stated: 
The general rule has grown up that in order 
for the insured to claim a waiver or estoppel 
to rely upon particular defenses by a denial of 
liability upon a different ground, it must be 
shown that he was lulled into security by the 
company's action so that it would be unfair to 
permit the defense, or that there was a change 
of position or prejudicial reliance thereon. 
In addition, Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief 
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//hose favor It i:i rendered is entitled". 
I"::u3, wiier - ---c e.iience was in, the trial c o u n properly 
granted judgment ir *;nformance therewith. 
.- - ;thir 11 / 'ill i P1 a l *3 i < i rr« in-
stances significant iv different frcr t: xse In \;;:. net, 
r
 *-'.ve the iui; ^vir^n4" ^r ~'r *~ ~~~ J>^ ;--• ^w -w_w 
i;.cu.rea lc;\a~r upon threat . : ..ai- : 
?-* ?reer also argues ~hao 1* \cjid n -T have surrendered "he 
a: cur :ne accesc prociei:;. .nak argumeni: rid3 r--_, 
ri wr. ana oucussea . **. _.. _j. *•_: 
w*-e paymer* ~; Pioneer wc^lo not ha*"<j : --r increased. 
-P.'I ' • <- ',-'" -] « -* - ' gation, 
the trial couro foum *:.<-- eviieri':^ .tt'a.ris: Pi^n-^ ni'h 
would have had no taxes or loss bi it foi " i ts voluntary 
purchase of Lake Mea iows as ai I ii I v es cmei it. Da v j dsc "!l " :;i * ; tted 
that he thought the two condominiums had sufficient va-ae 
, , ,e, : _ - .. :eu_y #vhich was in substance what haoo^ned 
when Pioneer uhrearened to sell and received i 'all p—-:::•-r... 
of the debt. 
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CONCLUSION 
At all times Title Guarantee dealt with Pioneer in good 
faith. Title Guarantee had no knowledge until after January 
15, 1982 of any fact in this case except the issuing of the 
policy. At the very least, by December, 1981 Pioneer had 
knowingly reconveyed a portion of the insured access and then 
knowingly purchased Lake Meadows in fee as an investment without 
that access. At the same time Pioneer scheduled a sale of 
its remaining collateral to collect its loan, and when first 
contacted by Title Guarantee Pioneer threatened to sell its 
remaining collateral unless the entire debt were paid. Title 
Guarantee promptly paid Pioneer more than the limits of the 
policy. Such payment extinguished any policy obligation as 
was determined by the trial court. Pioneer simply misunder-
stands the policy limits. 
Par from presenting clear and convincing evidence of 
fraud or bad faith, the testimony of Pioneer's own witnesses 
contradicts its present arguments. Moreover, payment by 
Title Guarantee certainly eliminates such claims. In any case 
the trial court resolved disputed facts against Pioneer in 
regard to all issues and Pioneer is not entitled to prevail 
on those claims. 
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Th e judgment of the trial court la correct and should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this 21st day •? "?r-, l~0r"\ 
Respec fc.fu]'" ° emitted, 
Walter P.'Faber., jr. 
attorney fcr Tl^le Guarantee 
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JM THE: DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
II IL AND FOR SALT" LAKE COUNTY,, STATE OF 'UTAH 
P I O N E E R STATE BAI 4I< , Hi dill 
corporat ion, 
P l a in t i f f , 
DENNIS VJ. ^ HURCH, . -. — A . 
RAY M. MAAG, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY, 
Utah corporation, THE TITLE 
GUARANTEE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
C I V I L Nil \ i u 4.i'jn 
T r i d l I I lu1 .ill mv P. "«:api loncd irMMnr cam* mi hipfore t h i s 
C o u r t t h e 2 0 t h of J u n e , 1984, w i t h p l a i n t i f f b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d by 
"' ~" :*> Z z * d e f e n d a n t s C h u r - ^ ~ 1 " ^ v ; - -^?ing r e p r e -
s e n t e d ^ . . - ^c ,„ Juo^ria., , Escr . and . ii i te e Compai 13 
b ^ i n g r e p r e s e n t e d : \ A3 * * Faber , " r . # Eso . * - *-- c o n c l u s i o n 
~° ; i uune Lhe T^ur t as<ed - "• - *s ing a r g u -
ment-- _. 1 *. . - i - . • - • -*j *"^G n I a i p " J 1: - ^ n ci-yc * * /.. t o s upp J y 
t h e C o u r t w i t h t h e c l o s i n g w r i t t e n a rgument and f i v e days t 0 r e p l y 
t :> c l o s i i ig wi 1 t 1 t;n rinjumeul 3 > it" ' let cmnlati'l j . Defendant 5 wer • s g:i rei: 1 
t e n days a f t e r t h e f i r s t t e n days which had been g i v e n t o t h e 
p 1! a i nt: :i f f i n wh i ch 1:o submit thei 1 written closing arguments. As 
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of the 27th of July, no closing written arguments had been received 
by the Court and the Court on checking the Clerk's Office found that 
all of the closing arguments in writing had been submitted to the 
Clerk's Office with plaintiffs1 having been stamped in the 27th 
of June and defendants1 the 11th and 6th of July with the final 
response by the plaintiff the 12th of July. All of these closing 
arguments in writing were in a backer in the Clerk's Office and 
of course had not been forwarded to the Court, thus causing the delay 
in preparation of this written Memorandum Decision. 
The Court after reviewing all of the written closing arguments, 
the applicable cases, the exhibits 1 through 32 as received and 
the notes taken by the Court at the time of the trial now makes and 
enters its Memorandum Decision as follows. 
The Court finds that the loan of $70,000 which was taken out 
by defendants Church, Lewis and Maag was for the purpose of develop-
ment of a subdivision in Provo, Utah called the Lake Meadows Subdivi-
sion in part and to assist in the business of Rocky Mountain Title 
and Abstract Company which defendants Church, Lewis and Maag were 
the principal officers of. The loan of $70,000 was given to defen-
dants by Pioneer State Bank (the plaintiff) and to secure this loan 
the bank took a second trust deed on the Lake Meadows property which 
second position was inferior to Utah Valley Bank and Trust's first 
position. As additional collateral the plaintiff, Pioneer, required 
two condominiums in the Willowbrook Hills area. Both the Lake 
Meadows property and the Willowbrook Hills condominium property 
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were Insured by a Safeco title policy issued 'trough defendant Rocky 
i sa 3 • I Saf ecc • t -  ne same c—nr anv : =• -i^ f endant T~ "~^e 
Guarantee Company. Subsequent- *-~ ••^e loan o: 
Meadows Subdiv: s ion ^ -,-p^rt- v r^n :nt r •,; f f ict. : r *- :n that the second 
exit and entranc-. • _ - • . . - • • :ond i t :i • : n 
precedent * juaiifvinq the clat was n^ t- avai„acie to the defendants 
^ * ; n i - ~ n 
through i *• a* sa^> -* d v.* . aere^.> i\-o a .-..^ uv- . . wr.-_- :.y one 
Jcnn ".ivl"" 1 ; i r? r lom was n^" ~] s r^osed " ") n^ oar < ti, ~ CH 
o ^ . \ *. uw ^:.u^c.-^ : J . j : 3 a s e a DO.*.. .
 : -
Meadows Subdivis ion s^ u n v - . vcoiv. ya tcrr ccu-d be mac- tc vr , Taylor 
- - _^  
individual aerenaan: : . In :ne meant.me bocaucr ei a :;4;cdi. t trie 
: H S L mcrt^aae-. or r?rc?>T'' vr tie ^  tke Meadows oror-r^v fc no n * * i 
tiff ban,< ;,.- purcnasec .'< La-:, "IL^JOW? orope. . . 
s F* 1 e f J ~ ' 'all-"" * a. k t " r ~ ne s u.^  ' v *r ^  1 6 ? 1 . 7 J - Under t hr eat: 
,. *• * -ci - -
qvate security ;;r * ne collateral of t *i , * t . r ;,ac /cen ..Loaned 
t" *-he individ;:-!1 d e f e n d a n t TttLe Guarantee paid to t~he plaintiff 
ban* : he sum n- _ . ' , •. _ , exoeeti^d J^ 
amount of the title policy covering the r'O^OOC l:an, said -rtcunt 
being $60,000 princd paJ oi i the c • " • -• ""' •---."-.- 1 
$588.93 in costs, fees and expenses. 
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At this juncture the bank had in its possession $77,326.98 in 
cash as a result of the Safeco policy on the condominiums as well as 
the Lake Meadows property which according to the bank's expert wit-
ness without two accesses was worth $36,000.00 as an undeveloped 
raw ground area. The bank's expert, Mr. Harward, also testified 
as to this value and also testified that he did not know that the 
property might not be developed as a plcinned subdivision by securing 
another access area other than the one which had been denied to the 
original developers and defendants in this case by Mr. John Taylor. 
Further, on direct testimony the bank's own operating officer indicat 
that he did not know whether or not the bank had been served in the 
quiet title action brought by Mr. Taylor against the defendants herei 
when he discovered that his name had been forged to a deed conveying 
to defendants herein whatever interest he had in the access. The 
defendants have continually maintained that they acquired the access 
by way of a tax sale and that John Taylorfs interest was agreed upon 
and had been promised to them in exchange for certain lots in the sub 
division which Mr. Taylor then renigged on and set a price which the 
developers could not meet. 
Based on the foregoing then it is this Court's finding as a 
matter of fact that the bank has expended $151,639.31 and received 
value by way of payment from defendant Title Guarantee Company and 
value by way of possession of the Lake Meadows property of $113,326.9 
leaving the bank on the short end to the sum of $38,312.33. In addi-
tion the bank claims that they are out the amount of the tax liabilit 
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• : i :t I ake Meadows as a subdivision rat he r t han t he amo un t o f t he t ax 
1 iabi 1 ity which might be assessed on 11 ie proper ty as agi: i • : i :i 1 11 ] :i : a 1 
land The Court finds that based on the position that the bank ob-
t a i i i e d t * f j: i i r c 1 l a s e o f t i: ::i, e I J t a I: l 1!; ' a 1 ] e y 3 a i i k f s f i r s 1: p o s :i 1: j o n 
on the prope:*y that the tax liability as of this juncture is the 
sn im test ified to by Mr Harvard as bed ng $700.00 annually rather than 
the sum. if taxed as a subdivision of $3] , 250 00 . 
The Court finds that though the pavment ;/; Title Guarantee on 
11 i e p o 1 i c y :i i i . o J • • i i i g 1:1 I e W i 1 ] o w t • i * • . - -
ment on the policy which was given * • :v oartK n 'j:venn: th=.: 
$70 000 loan, nevertheless, the ^cr'^ .- ~\? r r " v w*o insisted on 
the ;undc:r.ir::.uais as aa-L:i :,,,. ^.^.atuJa ' 1 - . ., , *  
payment on -:r.e police r' satisfaction of an -,ol igat ion c^-sz.z: •:: ng 
t i) 11: i e: s a i i: i e .] 3 n d e r t y ': i I e s a m e t :i t: ] e • :: :) m p a n y i i s c h a r g e s t h a t c: • b 1 1 g a -
tion and the argument of the bank that no claim, has been made on the 
i ni t i a 1 poJ i cy on Lake Meadows , this Coin: t finds without merit. 
F u r t h e r , f h is Court finds that t h e b a. n k h as no t t a ken any s t e p s 
to mitigate its damage by way of the obligation to look into the pros-
p e c !: :: f d e v e 1 o p i r i g 1:1 l e s i i b d i ,! >' :i s :i :) i: i * i t!: i a n o t h e r a r e a t :> b e :»b t a i n e d 
as an access nor has it dor ie anything to minimize its tax liability 
as indicated might be done by its owi i expert but to the contrary has 
attempted by way of buying i i I the first mortgagee's position to ob-
tain a property which it contemplated would be greatly increased in 
, a 1 "i i e . A s a r ~ ' f a : t 1: h =s b a i l k 1 : i i r e o f f € r: e d t < D S e 11 ". 
- -. -hes-3 d e f e n d a n t s znc p r c p ^ r t y IT: nu^ l u r c n a s o u _n u- ssme . . : . , 000 
f o r Liie sum :f S 1 0 0 f 0 0 ; , -. h e r o by a _ tomcr in 7 : o c o t a m a $ I 0 , 0 0 u i n -
c r e a s e in th*_ 3 a . j s : r . . : i j a c : u . ^ 
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The Court fails to see that defendants Church and Lewis 
defrauded the bank and that the representations which had been made 
to the bank by defendant Church were in fact true. Further, the 
Court finds no fraud by either defendants Church or Lewis on the 
grounds that the bank did not suffer any damage as a result of their 
representations nor did they have the necessary intent or knowledge 
to make the representations to the bank that the bank plaintiff herein 
alleges. 
The bank as knowledgeable investor purchased the Lake Meadows 
property with an intent to utilize their position to their own ad-
vantage as an investor and in fact their principal operating officer 
testified at the trial indicated that it was their intent to purchase 
the property as an investment and the fact that as a subdivision the 
property has decreased in value without the second access so that the 
bank now stands to lose as a net loss some $38,312.33 cannot and will 
not be adjusted by this Court on any of the grounds alleged. The 
Court further feels that the issue of unjust enrichment as alleged 
by Title Guarantee Company need not be addressed under the analysis 
set forth heretofore by this Court and that based on all of the 
information obtained at the time of trial, the applicable law and 
facts as indicated in this Memorandum Decision the Court finds against 
the bank and in favor of these defendants, no cause for action. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT?* I» 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
PIONEER STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, 
RAY M. MAAG, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, THE TITLE 
GUARANTEE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No, C-82-8350 
JUDGE DAVID B. DEE 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for non-jury 
trial on June 20 and 21, 1984 before the Court, the Honorable David 
B. Dee, District Judge, presiding, plaintiff being represented by 
its counsel, Richard D. Burbidge, Esq., defendants Dennis G. Church, 
Jay E. Lewis and Rocky Mountain Title & Abstract Company being repre-
sented by their counsel, Frederick A. Jackman, Esq,, defendant The 
Title Guarantee Company being represented by its counsel, Walter P. 
Faber, Jr., Esq., and defendant Ray M. Maag having been dismissed as 
a defendant prior to trial and not appearing as a party, and the 
parties having introduced evidence, having rested, and thereafter 
having submitted written closing arguments as requested by the Court, 
4»1 
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and the Court after having reviewed the written closing arguments, 
the applicable cases, Exhibits 1 through 32, and the notes taken 
by the Court at the time of trial, and being fully advised in the 
premises, and having made and entered its Memorandum Decision hereby 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The loan of $70,000 which was taken out by one Douglas 
W. Church and the named individual defendants Church, Lewis and 
Maag, was for the purpose of development of a subdivision in Provo, 
Utah called the Lake Meadows Subdivision, and also to assist in the 
business of Rocky Mountain Title & Abstract Company of which the 
said Douglas W. Church and defendants Church, Lewis and Maag were 
the principal officers. 
2. Douglas W. Church actively participated in negotiations) 
for said loan but was not named by plaintiff as a defendant in the 
case. 
3. The loan of $70,000 was given by plaintiff to Douglas 
W. Church and defendants Church, Lewis and Maag, and to secure this 
loan plaintiff took a Second Trust Deed on the Lake Meadows property 
which second position was inferior to Utah Valley Bank & Trust's 
first position. 
4. As additional collateral for the loan, plaintiff 
required two condominiums in the Willowbrook Hills area. 
(SB& 
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5. Both the Lake Meadows property and the Willowbrook 
Hills condominium property were insured by defendant Title Guarantee 
under a title policy for $70,000 issued through defendant Rocky 
Mountain to plaintiff. 
6. Subsequent to the loan of $70,000 the Lake Meadows 
Subdivision property ran into difficulty in that the second exit and 
entrance which was required by Provo City as a condition precedent 
to qualifying the plat was not available to Douglas W. Church and 
the individual defendants though they thought they had purchased 
the ground in question through a tax sale and that it merely had a 
cloud on it because of the interest of one John Taylor and his wife. 
7. To initially qualify the plat with Provo City and 
clear up the cloud on the title to the one access, Douglas W. Church 
signed Mr. and Mrs. Taylors1 names to a deed for the Taylors1 
interest without the Taylors1 consent although Douglas W. Church 
believed the Taylors had previously agreed to the transaction. 
8. The access problem was not disclosed to plaintiff at 
the time of the loan and plaintiff was thereafter induced by Douglas 
W. Church to reconvey a portion of the property of the Lake Meadows 
Subdivision so that a reconveyance could be made to the Taylors as 
a result of the Taylors having brought a quiet title action against 
Douglas W. Church and the individual defendants and also named 
plaintiff as a defendant. 
-4-
9. Although plaintiff was a named defendant in the 
Taylor's quiet title action and a Lis Pendens had been recorded in 
the spring of 1980, on direct testimony plaintiff's own operating 
officer indicated that he did not know whether or not plaintiff had 
been served in the Taylors' quiet title action which the Taylors 
started after they discovered that their names had been forged to a 
deed conveying to Douglas W. Church and the individual defendants 
whatever interest the Taylors had in the access. 
10. The defendants have continually maintained that they 
acquired the disputed access area by way of a tax sale and that 
trade of the Taylors' interest was agreed upon and had been promised 
to them in exchange for certain lots in the subdivision which the 
Taylors then reneged on and set a price which the developers could 
not meet. 
11. Thereafter, in December, 19 81, at a foreclosure sale 
of the Lake Meadows property under the first Trust Deed by Utah 
Valley Bank, plaintiff voluntarily purchased for investment the 
Lake Meadows property at the Utah Valley sale for the sum of 
$81,631.30. As of this time, plaintiff had not notified Title 
Guarantee of the sale or any of the problems or made any claim on 
the title policy. 
12. In February, 1982 under plaintiff's threat of sale of 
-5-
the two condominiums which plaintiff acknowledged were adequate 
security for the collateral of $70,000 which had been loaned to 
Douglas W. Church and the individual defendants, Title Guarantee paid] 
to plaintiff the sum of $77,326. §8 which was the total amount of the 
obligation and which exceeded the amount of the title policy covering) 
the $70,000 loan, said amount being $60,000 principal on the con-
dominiums, $16,738.05 interest, and $588.93 in costs, fees and 
expenses. 
13. At the same time plaintiff offered to sell to Title 
Guarantee the Lake Meadows property it had purchased for some 
$81,000 for the higher sum of $100,000, thereby attempting to obtain 
a $20,000 increase in the sales transaction. 
14. At this juncture plaintiff had in its possession 
$77,326.98 in cash as a result of the title policy on the condom-
iniums as well as the Lake Meadows property which according to 
plaintiff's expert witness without two accesses was worth $36,000 
as an undeveloped raw ground area. 
15. Plaintiff's expert, Mr. Harward, also testified as 
to this value and also testified that he did not know that the 
property might not be developed as a planned subdivision by securing 
another access area other than the one which had been denied to 
the original developers and defendants in this case by the Taylors. 
16. Plaintiff has expended $151,6 39.31 and received 
4?5 
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value by way of payment from defendant Title Guarantee Company and 
value by way of possession of the Lake Meadows property of $113,326.9)8 
leaving plaintiff on the short end to the sum of $38,312.33. 
17. Although plaintiff claims it is out the amount of the 
tax liability on Lake Meadows as a subdivision rather than the amount) 
of the tax liability which might be assessed on the property as 
agricultural land, the Court finds that based on the position that 
plaintiff obtained by way of purchase of the Utah Valley Bank's 
first position on the property that the tax liability is the sum 
testified to by Mr. Harward as being $700.00 annually rather than 
the sum if taxed as a subdivision of $31,250. 
18. The Court finds that though the payment by Title 
Guarantee on the policy involving the Willowbrook Hills condominiums 
was not payment on the policy which was given to the bank in covering] 
their $70,000 loan, nevertheless, the bank is the party who insisted 
on the condominiums as additional collateral to the subdivision and 
payment on one policy in satisfaction of an obligation outstanding 
to the same lender by the same title company discharges that obliga-
tion and the argument of the bank that no claim has been made on 
the initial policy on Lake Meadows, this Court finds without merit. 
19. Plaintiff presented no persuasive evidence of malice, 
bad faith or fraud on the part of Title Guarantee. 
4?& 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this 
case. 
2. The representations made by Douglas W, Church and the 
individual defendants to plaintiff were in fact true and not 
fraudulent, 
3. Title Guarantee did not breach its contract and was 
not guilty of malice, bad faith or fraud toward plaintiff, 
4. Plaintiff suffered no damage as a result of any 
representations made to it. 
5. The individual defendants did not have the necessary 
intent or knowledge on which fraud against plaintiff could be based. 
6. Plaintiff was a knowledgeable investor who purchased 
Lake Meadows at the Utah Valley Bank sale for an investment. 
7. The Court finds that though the payment by Title 
Guarantee on the policy involving the Willowbrook Hills condominiums 
was not payment on the policy which was given to the bank in covering! 
their $70,000 loan, nevertheless, the bank is the party who insisted 
on the condominiums as additional collateral to the subdivision and 
payment on one policy in satisfaction of an obligation outstanding 
to the same lender by the same title company discharges that obliga-
tion and the argument of the bank that no claim has been made on 
4*? 
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the initial policy on Lake Meadows, this Court finds without merit. 
8. Plaintiff has not taken any steps to mitigate its 
damage by way of the obligation to look into the prospect of develop-
ing the subdivision with another area to be obtained as an access 
nor has it done anything to minimize or mitigate its tax liability 
as indicated might be done by its own expert but to the contrary has 
attempted by way of buying in the first mortgagee's position to 
obtain for investment a property which it contemplated would be 
greatly increased in value and cannot now complain about a decrease 
in value, 
9. Defendants are entitled to judgment against plaintiff 
on all claims no cause for action. /I 
DATED this IW day of AZ^jf^^ * 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Date : 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON htNDLEY 
DspLty Cterk 
( con t . on page 9) 
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( con t . ) - 9 -
Date : October 3, 1984 
F r e d e r i c k A. Jaoxman ^ 
Date: /&/3/7 cf 
Walter P. Faber , J r . 7 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., #0492 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq., #2278 
BURBIDGE * MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Elks Building 
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
al t Lake City, Utah 84111 
801 355-6677 
Salt Lake County Utah 
NOV 9,1984 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PIONEER STATE BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, et al., 
Defendants. 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. C 82-8350 
David B. Dee, Judge 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for non-jury tr ial on 
June 20 and 21, 1984, before the Court, the Honorable David B. Dee, District 
Judge, presiding, Plaintiff being represented by its counsel, Richard D. 
Burbidge, Defendants Dennis G. Church, Jay E. Lewis and Rocky Mountain Title 
S Abstract Company bbeing represented by their counsel, Frederick A. 
Jackman, Defendant The Title Guarantee Company being represented by its 
counsel, Walter P. Faber, Jr . , and Defendant Ray M. Maag having been 
dismissed as a Defendant prior to tr ia l and not appearing as a party, and 
the parties having introduced evidence, having rested, and thereafter having 
submitted written closing arguments as requested by the Court, and the Court 
after having reviewed the written closing arguments, the applicable cases, 
Exhibits 1 through 32, and the notes taken by the Court at the time of 
t r i a l , being fully advised in the premises, having made and entered its 
44E 
Memorandum Decision and having made and fi led Findings of Fact and 
onclusions of Law, ordered that Judgment be entered in accordance therewith 
as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that: 
1. Defendants have Judgment against Plaintiff on Plaintiff 's 
Complaint, no cause for action, 
2. Defendants are awarded their taxable costs. 
DATED this 
BY THE COURT: 
i u^ a r c a w a r u c u tn t r i r i ,dAciuie L U b u b . 
rf day o f ^ % K v , 1984. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Judgment was mailed 
to Walter P. Faber, Jr. of Watkins 4 Faber, 2102 East 3300 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84109, Defendants Dennis Church, 656 Autumn Circle, Elkridge, 
Utah 84660, Jay Lewis, 476 West 700 South, Orem, Utah 84058, on the J2_ 
day of November, 1984. /x-. 
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POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE 
issued by 
The Title Guarantee Company 
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21202 
3JECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE PRO-
[IONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, THE TITLE GUARANTEE COMPANY, a Maryland 
poration, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the ! 
>unt of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay 
Kinder, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land; 
4. Unmarketability of such title; 
5. The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest except to the extent that 
such invalidity or unenforceability, or claim thereof, arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage and is 
based upon 
a. usury, or 
b. any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law ; 
6. The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage; 
7. Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain priority over the lien of the insured mort-
gage, except any such lien arising from an improvement on the land contracted for and commenced subsequent to Date of 
Policy not financed in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage which at Date of 
Policy the insured has advanced or is obligated to advance; or 
8. The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment, shown in Schedule A, of the insured mortgage or the failure of said as-
signment to vest title to the insured mortgage in the named insured assignee free and clear of all liens. 
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 
e following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy: 
1. Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances) restricting ot 
regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of the land, or regulating the character, dimensions or location of 
any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in ownership or a reduction in the dimen-
sions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation of any such law, ordinance or governmental regulation. 
2. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police power unless notice of the exercise of such rights appears in the 
public records at Date of Policy. 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claim-
ant; (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the insured claimant either at Date of 
Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by this policy or acquired the insured mortgage and 
not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured claimant became an insured 
hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant; (d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy 
(except to the extent insurance is afforded herein as to any statutory lien for labor or material). 
4. Unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage because of failure of the insured at Date of Policy or of any subsequent 
owner of the indebtedness to comply with applicable "doing business" laws of the state in which the land is situated. 
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this policy to be signed and sealed, to become valid when countersigned by a 
[dating officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws. 
s 
Issued by 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY 
The Title Guarantee Company 
ATTEST : 
President 
This policy valid only if Schedules A and B are attached 
/ j Secretary
 (/jjj 
POLICY NUMBER: 
m 18640 SCHEDULE B 
This policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following: 
PART I l. Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies 
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records. 
2. Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained 
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3. Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records. 
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which a correct 
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by the public records. 
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water 
rights, claims or title to water. 
6. Possible unfiled mechanics' and materialmen's liens. 
7. The dower, curtesy, homestead, community property, or other statutory marital rights, if any, of the spouse of any 
individual Insured. 
PART II 
1. Taxes for the year 1979 new due and payable but will not become 
delinquent until Ndvember 30, 1979. 
2. Any Special Assessments levied for the year 1979 are shown current, 
but this Policy does not insure against possible future Assessments 
levied for the balance of the year 1979 and subsequent years. 
3. AFFECTS PARCEL 1: An Easement over and across said property, 
August 7, 1978 and executed by CLAVIN GRAY and HELEN GRAY, in 
favor of UTAH Power and light company recorded October 3, 1978 
as Entry No. 39800 in Book 1685 at page 711 of Official Records. 
4. AFFECTS PARCELS 2 and 3: Annual maintenance assessments, special 
maintenance assessments penalties, administrative assessments 
and interest or costs unpaid which may have been levied or assessed 
by willowbrook hill condominiums homeowners association. 
5. AFFECTS PARCEL 1: A Deed of Trust, executed by DOUGLAS W. CHURCH, 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, RAY M. MAAC as Trustor, to secure 
/cj payment of a note bearing even date thereof in the sum of $65,000.00 
with interest thereon, payable as therein provided, to UTAH VALLEY 
BANK, as Trustee, in favor of UTAH VALLEY BANK, as Beneficiary, 
recorded May 11, 1979 as Entry No. 18090 of Official Records. 
'< 
6. Rights of way for any roads, ditches, canals, or transmission 
lines new existing over, under, or across said property. 
* *** * *** * 
Countersigned: 
Validating Officer or Agent 
s 
The Title Guarantee Company 
POLICY NUMBER 
MU 18640 
r No. 0 -
VALID ONLY IF SCHEDULES A & B ARE 
ATTACHED TO ALTA LOAN POLICY-FORM M-3-1970 
Order 
DATE OF POLICY-
November 19, 1979 
O-46201-U 
a t 11:44 P.M. 
SCHEDULE A 
NAME OF INSURED 
THE TOTAL CHARGE FOR THIS 
POLICY INCLUDING RISK PRE-
MIUM IS $ 1 8 9 . 0 0 
AMOUNT 
, 70,000.00 
WESTEFN HOME BANK 
1. The estate or interest tn the land identified in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage is. 
Fee Simple 
2. The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in 
DOUGLAS W. CHURCH, DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, and RAY M. MA£G 
A 
*x 
3. The mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortgage, and the assignments thereof, if any, are described as follows: 
A Deed of Trust dated October 4, 1979, executed by DOUGLAS W. CHURCH 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, and RAY M. MAAG as Trustor , to 
secure payment of a note bearing even date thereof in the sum of 
% q $70,000.00 with interest thereon, payable as therein provided, to 
Mj«> WESTERN HOME BANK, as Trustee , in favor of WESTEFN HOME BANK, a Utah 
^ Corporation, as Beneficiary, recorded Noveirtoer 19, 1979 as Entry 
No. 45164 of Off ic ia l Records. 
R 
The land referred to in this policy is described as set forth in the mortgage above mentioned, and identified as follows: 
The following described real property is situated in Utah County, 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
PARCEL 1: All of Lots 1 to 57, inclusive, Plat "A", LAKE MEADCWS 
SUBDIVISION, a subdivision, of Provo, Utah, according to the official 
plat thereof on file in the office of the County Recorder of Utah 
County, State of Utah. 
PARCEL 2: F-1455-61-1 Building 4 J Floor 3, Unite B, WILLCWBROOK HILL 
CONDOMINIUMS, Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof 
and subject to the recitals thereon on file in the office of the County 
Recorder of Utah County, State of Utah. 
PARCEL 2: F-1466-61-1 Building 5, Floor 1, Unite D, WILLCWBROOK HILL 
CONDOMINIUMS, Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof 
and subject to the recitals thereon on file in the office of the County 
Recorder of Utah County, State of Utah. 
* *** * *** * 
The Title Guarantee Company 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
L. Definition of Terms 
The following terms when used in this policy mean: 
(a) "insured": the insured named in Schedule A. The term "insured" 
also includes ( i ) the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage and each successor in ownership of such indebtedness (reserving, 
however, all rights and defenses as to any such successor who acquires the 
indebtedness by operation of law as distinguished from purchase including, 
but not limited to, heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors, personal repre-
sentatives, next of kin or corporate or fiduciary successors that the 
Company would have had against the successor's transferor), and further 
includes (ii) any governmental agency or instrumentality which is an 
insurer or guarantor under an insurance contract or guaranty insuring or 
guaranteeing said indebtedness, or any part thereof, whether named as an 
insured herein or not, and (iii) the parties designated in paragraph 2 (a) 
of these Conditions and Stipulations. 
(b) "insured claimant": an insured claiming loss or damage here-
under. 
(c) "knowledge": actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge or 
notice which may be imputed to an insured by reason of any public 
records. 
(d) "land": the land described, specifically or by reference in Sched-
ule A, and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute real 
property; provided, however, the term "land" does not include any prop-
erty beyond the lines of the area specifically described or referred to in 
Schedule A, nor any right, title, interest, estate or easement in abutting 
streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or waterways, but nothing herein 
shall modify or limit the extent to which a right of access to and from the 
land is insured by this policy. 
(e) "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other security 
instrument. 
(f) "public records": those records which by law impart construc-
tive notice of matters relating to said land. 
2. (a) Continuation of Insurance after Acquisition of Title 
This policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in favor of an 
insured who acquires all or any part of the estate or interest in the land 
described in Schedule A by foreclosure, trustee's sale, conveyance in lieu 
of foreclosure, or other legal manner which discharges the lien of the in-
sured mortgage, and if the insured is a corporation, its transferree of the 
estate or interest so acquired, provided the transferee is the parent or 
wholly owned subsidiary of the insured; and in favor of any governmental 
agency or instrumentality which acquires all or any part of the estate or 
interest pursuant to a contract of insurance or guaranty insuring or 
guaranteeing the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage; provided 
that the amount of insurance hereunder after such acquisition, exclusive 
of costs, attorneys' lees and expenses which the Company may become 
obligated to pay, shall not exceed the least of: 
( i ) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A; 
(ii) the amount of the unpaid principal of the indebtedness as defined 
in paragraph 8 hereof, plus interest thereon, expenses of fore-
closure and amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured 
mortgage and secured by said insured mortgage at the time of 
acquisition of such estate or interest in the land; or 
(iii) the amount paid by any governmental agency or instrumentality, 
if such agency or instrumentality is the insured claimant, in the 
acquisition of such estate or interest in satisfaction of its insur-
ance contract or guaranty. 
(b) Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance of Title 
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy 
in favor of an insured so long as such insured retains an estate or 
interest in the land, or holds an indebtedness secured by a purchase money 
mortgage given by a purchaser from such insured, or so long as such 
insured shall have liability by reason of covenants of warranty made by 
such insured in any transfer or conveyance of such estate or interest; pro-
vided, however, this policy shall not continue in force in favor of any 
purchaser from such insured of either said estate or interest or the in-
debtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured. 
3. Defense and Prosecution of Actions—Notice of Claim to be given 
by an Insured Claimant 
(a) The Company, at its own cost and without undue delay, shall 
provide for the defense of an insured in all litigation consisting of actions 
or proceedings commenced against such insured, or defenses, restraining 
orders or injunctions interposed against I foreclosure of the insured 
mortgage or a defense interposed against an insured in an action to enforce 
a contract for a sale of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, 
or a sale of the estate or interest in said land, to the extent that such 
litigation is founded upon an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or other 
matter insured against by this policy. 
(b) The injured shall notify the Company promptly in writing ( i ) in 
case any action or proceeding is begun or defense or restraining order or 
injunction is interposed as set forth in (a) above, (ii) in case knowledge 
shall come to an insured hereunder of any claim of title or interest which 
is adverse to the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured 
mortgage, as insured, and which might cause loss or damage for whicli 
the Company may be liable by virtue of this policy, or (iii) ii title to the 
estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, is re-
jected as unmarketable. If such prompt notice shall not be given to the 
Company, then as to such insured all liability of the Company shall cease 
and terminate in regard to the matter or matters for which such prompt 
notice is required; provided, however, that failure to notify shall in no 
case prejudice ihe rights of any such insured under this policy unless the 
Company shall be prejudiced by such failure and then only to the ex-
tent of such prejudice. 
(c) The Company shall have the right at its own cost to institute and 
without undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any 
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish 
the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, as 
insured, and the Company may take any appropriate action under the 
terms of this policy, whether or not it shall be liable thereunder, and shaii 
not thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this policy. 
(d) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or inter-
posed a defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this policy, 
the Company may pursue any such litigation to final determination by a 
court of competent jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right, in its 
sole discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or order. 
(e) In all cases where the policy permits or requires the Company to 
prosecute or provide for the defense of any action or proceeding, the 
insured hereunder shall secure to the Company the right to so prosecute 
or provide defense in such action or proceeding, and all appeals therein^ 
and permit the Company to use, at its option, the name of such insured 
for such purpose. Whenever requested by the Company, such insured shall 
give the Company all reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding, in 
effecting settlement, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, or prosecuting 
or defending such action or proceeding, and the Company shall reimburse 
such insured for any expense so incurred. 
4. Notice of Ix>ss—Limitation of Action 
In addition to the notices required under paragraph 3(b) of these 
Conditions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any loss or damage 
for which it is claimed the Company is liable under this policy shall be 
furnished to the Company within 90 days after such loss or damage shall 
have been determined and no right of action shall accrue to an insured 
claimant until 30 days after such statement shall have been furnished. 
Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage shall terminate any 
liability of the Company under this policy as to such loss or damage. 
5. Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle for or in 
the name of an insured claimant any claim insured against or to terminate 
all liability and obligations of the Company hereunder by paying or 
tendering payment of the amount of insurance under this policy together 
with any costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred up to the time of 
such payment or tender of payment, by the insured claimant and 
authorized by the Company. In case loss or damage is claimed under this 
policy by an insured, the Company shall have the further option to 
purchase such indebtedness for the amount owing thereon together with 
ail costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company is obligated 
hereunder to pay. If the Company offers to purchase said indebtedness as 
herein provided; the owner of such indebtedness shall transfer and assign 
said indebtedness and the mortgage and any collateral securing the same 
to the Company upon payment therefor as herein provided. / 
CONTINUED ON BACK 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS—Continued 
Determination and Payment of Loss 
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall in no case 
xceed the least of: 
(i) (ii) 
(ii i) 
the actual loss of the insured claimant; or 
the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, or, if applicable, 
the amount of insurance as denned in paragraph 2(a) hereof; or 
the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage 
as determined under paragraph 8 hereof, at the time the loss or 
damage insured against hereunder occurs, together with interest 
thereon. 
(b) The Company wttt pay, in addition to any loss insured'ngainst by 
his policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation carried on by 
he Company for such insured, and all costs, attorneys' fees and expenses 
i litigation carried on by such insured with the written authorization of 
ie Company. 
(c) When liability has been definitely fixed in accordance with the 
onditions of this policy, the loss or damage shall be payable within 30 
ays thereafter. 
. Limitation of Liability 
No claim shall arise or be maintainable under this policy (a) if the 
lompany, after having received notice of an alleged defect, lien or 
ncumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or otherwise, re-
noves such defect, lien or encumbrance or establishes the title, or the lien 
\f the insured mortgage, as insured, within a reasonable time after receipt 
>f such notice; (b) in the event of litigation until there has been a final 
letermination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of all 
ppeals therefrom, adverse to the title or to the lien of the insured 
nortgage, as insured, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof; or (c) for 
lability voluntarily assumed by an insured in settling any claim or suit 
vithout prior written consent of the Company. 
3. Reduction of Liability 
(a) All payments under this policy, except payments made for costs, 
ittorneys' fees and expenses, shall reduce the amount of the insurance pro 
tanto; provided, however, such payments, prior to the acquisition of title 
to said estate or interest as provided in paragraph 2(a) of these Condi-
tions and Stipulations, shall not reduce pro tanto the amount of the in-
surance afforded hereunder except to the extent that such payments reduce 
the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage. 
Payment in full by any person or voluntary satisfaction or release of the 
insured mortgage shall terminate all liability of the Company except as 
provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof. 
(b) The liability of the Company shall not be increased by additional 
principal indebtedness created subsequent to Date of Policy, except as to 
amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured mortgage and secured 
thereby. 
No payment shall be made without producing this policy for endorse-
ment of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, in which 
case proof of loss or destruction shall be furnished to the satisfaction of 
the Company. 
9. Liability Noncumulative 
If the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfaction of 
the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or any part thereof, it is 
expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall 
be reduced by any amount the Company may pay under any policy 
insuring a mortgage hereafter executed by an insured which is a charge or 
lien on the estate or interest described or referred to in Schedule A, and 
the amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy. 
10. Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement 
Whenever the Company shall have settled a claim under this policy, all 
right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of 
the insured claimant, except that the owner of the indebtedness secured by 
the insured mortgage may release or substitute the personal liability of any 
debtor or guarantor, or extend or otherwise modify the terms of payment, 
or release a portion of the estate or interest from the lien of the insured 
mortgage, or release any collateral security for the indebtedness, provided 
such act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of notice of any claim of 
title or interest adverse to the title to the estate or interest or the priority 
of the lien of the insured mortgage and does not result in any loss of 
priority of the lien of the insured mortgage. The Company shall be 
subrogated to and be entitled to all rights and remedies which such 
insured claimant would have had against any person or property in respect 
to such claim had this policy not been issued, and ii requested by the 
Company, such insured claimant shall transfer to the Company all rights, 
and remedies against any person or property necessary in order to perfect 
such right of subrogation and shall permit the Company to use the name 
of such insured claimant in any transaction or litigation involving such 
rights or remedies. If the payment does not cover the loss of such insured 
claimant, the Company shall be subrogated to such rights and remedies; 
in the proportion which said payment bears to the amount of said loss, but 
such subrogation shall be in subordination to the insured mortgage. If loss 
of priority should result from any act of such insured claimant, such act 
shall not void this policy, but the Company, in that event, shall be re-
quired to pay only that part of any losses insured against hereunder which 
shall exceed the amount, if any, lost to the Company by reason of the inv 
pairment of the right of subrogation. 
11. Liability Limited to this Policy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instruments, 
if any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and contract 
between the insured and the Company. 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and 
which arises out of the status of the lien of the insured mortgage or of 
the title to the estate or interest covered hereby or any action asserting 
such claim, shall be restricted to the provisions and conditions and stipu-
lations of this policy. 
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made except by 
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President, 
a Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating officer 
or authorized signatory of the Company. 
12. Notices, Where Sent 
All notices required to be given the Company and any statement in 
writing required to be furnished the Company shall be addressed to 
it at its Home Office, Baltimore, Maryland 21202. 
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